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A "HANDY MAN'S" GUIDE TO COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT: STANDING, PUBLIC DOMAIN
AND REGISTRATION
Rock and roll was born in the 1950's and exploded into prominence
in the 60's. It has become such a powerful force that in the past 30 years
there has been little significant change in popular music. The songs of
Buddy Holly, Elvis and the Beatles are nearly as popular today as they
were when they were originally recorded. Rock and roll artists of the
eighties commonly remake old songs and rework old melodies. Thus, the
danger exists that the stylistic and melodic similarities between modern
music and early rock and roll will give rise to a plethora of infringement
claims. Jones v. Virgin Records, Ltd.' illustrates such a situation.
In 1959, Jimmy Jones and Otis Blackwell composed the song
"Handy Man." Jones and Blackwell then assigned their rights in the
composition to Shalimar Music Corporation ("Shalimar"). In the as-
signment agreement2 with Shalimar, Jones and Blackwell retained a
number of rights in "Handy Man," including the right to receive royal-
ties and the right to sue for copyright infringement if the assignee failed
to do so.3 Later that year, Shalimar registered "Handy Man" and filed
sheet music of the composition ("1959 version") with the Copyright Of-
fice. After a series of conveyances, the copyright was ultimately acquired
by CBS Catalogue Partnership, a subsidiary of CBS, Inc. Printed sheet
music of the 1959 version was published on two occasions.4
In 1960, "Handy Man" was recorded on phonorecords by Jimmy
Jones ("1960 version"). The 1960 version contained additional words
and music not found in the 1959 version filed with the Copyright Office.5
1. 643 F. Supp. 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
2. The contract of assignment of "Handy Man" was silent on the issue of derivative or
altered versions of the assigned work. The court, for the purpose of the standing issue, as-
sumed that the assignment contract contemplated all versions of the work. Id. at 1156 n.4.
3. Additional rights retained by the plaintiff were the right to reclaim all rights in the
work upon failure of the assignee to publish or produce a phonograph record of the work
within a specified period of time and the right to cancel the agreement should the assignee fail
to render royalty statements to the composers, pay the royalties due, or provide access to the
assignee's books. Id. at 1156 n.5.
4. Id. at 1155.
5. The 1960 addition to "Handy Man" consisted of an eight measure chorus containing
the following words:
Come-a, come-a, come-a
Come-a, come, come
yeah, yeah, yeah
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The song was also recorded by Del Shannon in 1964 and James Taylor in
1977.6 All three recordings of "Handy Man" contained additional words
and music not included in the 1959 copyrighted version. Printed sheet
music of the 1960 version was never published.7 A copyright in the 1960
version was filed in the name of CBS Catalogue Partnership on August
10, 1984.8
More than two decades after "Handy Man" was first recorded, Boy
George and the members of his band, Culture Club wrote and recorded
the song "Karma Chameleon."9 Jones and Blackwell asserted that the
chorus of "Karma Chameleon"' infringed the words and music added
to the 1960 version of "Handy Man."'" According to Jones and
Blackwell, financial success of "Handy Man" was largely due to the al-
Come-a, come-a, come-a
Come-a, come, come
Hold on, They'll come running to me
Yeah, Yeah, Yeah
Yeah, Yeah, Yeah.
6. All three releases of "Handy Man" achieved wide popularity. In 1960, Jimmy Jones'
performance of "Handy Man" reached number 2 on the Billboard Magazine Chart of best
selling records. James Taylor's performance reached number 4 in 1977 and Del Shannon's
version reached number 22 in 1964. Jones, 643 F. Supp. at 1155 n.l.
7. The court took judicial notice of the fact that the 1960 version was printed (with notice
of copyright) on the album cover of "JT," James Taylor's 1977 recording. However, because
neither party addressed the issue, the court did not consider it. Id. at 1158 n. 11.
8. Id. at 1155.
9. "Karma Chameleon" was written and recorded in 1983 and reached number I on the
national charts in 1984. Id.
10. The chorus of "Karma Chameleon" consisted of the words:
Karma, Karma, Karma, Karma
Karma, Chameleon.
11. The plaintiff's musicological report concluded that:
1. The section of 'Handy Man' and the section of 'Karma Chameleon' which contain
the similarities listed above are an important part of each song, constituting in each
song the 'hook' or 'ear catcher.' 2. The similarity and, in some cases, the exact dupli-
cation of phonetic sounds, combined with rhythm, harmony and melody, is too close
to be a coincidence. 3. The authors of 'Karma Chameleon' certainly had the oppor-
tunity of hearing 'Handy Man' and, in my opinion, consciously or subconsciously
copied the section of 'Handy Man.'
After comparing the words of the two songs, the report stated that:
[a]lthough the public accepts the words in 'Handy Man' as 'corn-a, com-a, com-a,
com-a, com-a' and the words in 'Karma Chameleon' as 'karma, karma, karma,
karma, karma,' this is probably because the public knows the name of the latter song.
I listened to the applicable sections of the three versions, and they are indistin-
guishable. In the Culture Club version, in the 'come and go' phrase, the 'come' and
'karm' aurally are the same.
The writer of the report, Oscar Brand, a writer and composer, advised the plaintiffs to use
the rock version of "Handy Man" as sung by Jimmy Jones for comparison. The suggestion
was made because the original James Taylor performance of "Handy Man" and Boy George's
performance of "Karma Chameleon," in Mr. Brand's opinion, "sound very different because
the arrangements are years apart." Musicological Report by Oscar Brand (Nov. 12, 1984).
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legedly infringed, "ear-catching"' 2 portion of the chorus which was ad-
ded to the 1960 version.' 3
Blackwell and Jones instituted a copyright infringement suit against
Virgin Records, Ltd. and Epic Records, issuers of the "Karma Chame-
leon" phonorecords; Virgin Music Publishing, Ltd. and Warner Tam-
erlan Music, the owners of the copyright in "Karma Chameleon;" and
CBS Catalogue Partnership. 4 They sought injunctive relief, actual dam-
ages, lost profits and reasonable attorney's fees.' 5
The defendants, Virgin Music Publishing Ltd. and Virgin Records
Ltd. moved for partial summary judgment. In support of their motion,
the defendants first asserted that Jones and Blackwell lacked standing to
sue for infringement since they assigned their copyright to Shalimar; and
in the alternative, that they failed to allege facts sufficient to establish
such standing. Second, defendants contended that "Handy Man" en-
tered the public domain because a copyright notice was not affixed to the
phonorecords and the song was published without statutory copyright
protection. Third, defendants maintained that the 1984 copyright regis-
tration of the 1960 version of "Handy Man" was ineffective. Finally,
defendants claimed that the plaintiffs were estopped from alleging in-
fringement because the owner of "Handy Man" and the owner of
"Karma Chameleon" shared the same corporate identity.'
6
In March of 1986, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York held in favor of the plaintiffs and denied summary
judgment to the defendants.' 7 In rejecting the defendants first argument,
that Jones and Blackwell relinquished their standing to sue when they
assigned the copyright in "Handy Man," the court relied on Cortner v.
Israel "8 Under Cortner, a composer's right to receive royalties was a
12. The plaintiff's musicological report explains that "[plop songs are often built around a
gimmick-an 'ear-catcher' that may be a repeated instrumental figure, an interesting bass run,
or a catchy rhythmic refrain. In these songs, the same catchy phrase is used to catch the
attention of the audience." Musicological Report by Oscar Brand (Nov. 12, 1984).
13. Jones, 643 F. Supp. at 1155.
14. Id. CBS Catalogue Partnership, the owner of the copyright in the song "Handy Man"
at the time of the motion for summary judgment, was joined as a defendant because, according
to the 1909 Copyright Act, a beneficial owner could bring an infringement action only after the
assignee had refused to bring such an action and the beneficial owner joined the assignee as a
party defendant to the action. Id. at 1160 n. 18 (citing Manning v. Miller Music Corp., 174 F.
Supp. 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1959)). However, because the 1976 Act was the appropriate Act for the
standing issue, it was not necessary to join the assignee as a party. See infro text accompany-
ing notes 52-57.
15. Jones, 643 F. Supp. at 1154-55.
16. Id. at 1156.
17. Id. at 1161.
18. 732 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1984).
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sufficient beneficial interest in the copyright to give them standing to sue
under both the 1909 and 1976 Copyright Acts. The 1976 Act codified
case law that developed under the 1909 Act which conferred a right to
sue for infringement on the beneficial owner.' 9 The House Report ac-
companying the 1976 Act states: "[a] 'beneficial owner' for this purpose
would include, for example, an author who had parted with legal title to
the copyright in exchange for percentage royalties based on sales or li-
cense fees." 2
Additionally, the Cortner court espoused its own justification for al-
lowing a party receiving royalties to institute an action for infringement.
It reasoned that "[w]hen a composer assigns copyright title to a publisher
in exchange for the payment of royalties, an equitable trust relationship
is established ... which gives the composer standing to sue for infringe-
ment . . . . Otherwise the beneficial owner's interest in the copyright
could be diluted or lessened by a wrongdoer's infringement.,
21
The Jones court found that Jones and Blackwell had a sufficient ben-
eficial interest in the song to maintain an action for infringement. The
court's decision was founded on the fact that in the assignment agree-
ment with Shalimar, Jones and Blackwell had retained a number of
rights in "Handy Man," including the right to receive royalties and the
right to sue for copyright infringement.22
The court was unpersuaded by the defendants' alternative claim that
Jones and Blackwell insufficiently alleged the existence of a present bene-
ficial interest since no evidence of a subsequent chain of ownership was
produced. Although the plaintiffs did not submit evidence of a present
beneficial interest in the song, they did attach the original assignment
contract proclaiming the rights they retained in "Handy Man" to the
affidavit in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. The court
found that the attached contract was sufficient evidence to defeat a mo-
tion for summary judgment.23
Next, the court rejected as "meritless" the defendants' second con-
tention that failure to affix a copyright notice to the 1960 phonorecords
of "Handy Man" caused the work to be surrendered to the public do-
19. "The legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled, sub-
ject to the requirements of sections 205(d) and 411, to institute an action for any infringement
of that particular right committed while he or she is the owner of it." 17 U.S.C. § 501(b)
(1982).
20. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 159 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5775.
21. Cortner, 732 F.2d at 271.
22. Jones v. Virgin Records, Ltd., 643 F. Supp. 1153, 1156-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
23. Jones, 643 F. Supp. at 1157.
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main. Section 9 of the 1909 Copyright Act required that notice of copy-
right be affixed to each published copy of a work to secure statutory
copyright protection in that copy. 24 The issue then became whether a
phonorecord was a "copy" for notice purposes under the 1909 Act. In
1908 the United States Supreme Court in White-Smith Publishing Co. v.
Apollo Co., 25 declared that "a music roll [for mechanical pianos] (and by
extension a phonorecord) is not a copy.., since a copy must be intelligi-
ble and in a form which can be seen or read."26 The definition of "copy"
set forth in White-Smith was adopted by the 1909 Copyright Act. Con-
sequently, failure to affix notice to a phonorecord did not defeat any
copyright protection otherwise applicable to the underlying musical
work recorded therein.
Similarly, the 1976 Copyright Act does not require that a copyright
notice be affixed to a phonorecord in order to protect the underlying mu-
sical work. The section 401 notice requirements for literary and musical
works apply only to "copies from which the work can be visually per-
ceived ... ."" Since a literary or musical work embodied in a pho-
norecord cannot be visually perceived, there is no need to place a notice
of copyright on the phonorecord in order to ensure copyright protection
under the current Act.28
There is also a notice requirement for sound recordings under sec-
tion 402 of the 1976 Act.29 However, section 402 was inapplicable be-
cause it protected sound recordings only.3" Under copyright law, literary
or musical works are considered separate works from sound recordings.
Each separate work is protected independently. A phonorecord may em-
body not only a sound recording, but also other works, such as literary or
musical creations. In order to avoid the possible confusion that may re-
24. Id. at n.6 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 9 (1909)).
25. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
26. Jones, 643 F. Supp. at 1157 (citing White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 17).
27. Whenever a work protected under this title is published in the United States or
elsewhere by authority of the copyright owner, a notice of copyright as provided by
this section shall be placed on all publicly distributed copies from which the work
can be visually perceived, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.
17 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1982).
28. 2 NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 7.12[B] (1987).
29. "Whenever a sound recording protected under this title is published in the United
States or elsewhere by authority of the copyright owner, a notice of copyright as provided by
this section shall be placed on all publicly distributed phonorecords of the sound recording."
17 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1982).
30. " 'Sound recordings' are works that result from the fixation of a series of musical,
spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as disks, tapes, or other
phonorecords, in which they are embodied." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
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sult from having the same notice requirements applying to sound record-
ings and to the literary and musical works they incorporate, Congress
determined that the copyright notice which must be placed on pho-
norecords would be required only for the protection of the sound record-
ing, not the underlying literary or musical work, embodied therein.3"
Therefore, the failure of Jones and Blackwell to affix a notice of copy-
right on the phonorecords did not defeat their claim for infringement of
the underlying musical composition.
The defendants also claimed that "Handy Man" was injected into
the public domain because it was "published" without statutory copy-
right protection. However, the court concluded that the 1960 version of
"Handy Man" had not been "published" and was, therefore, protected
by a common law copyright. The Jones court relied on the Second Cir-
cuit's decision in Roy Export Co. Establishment of Vaduz, Liechtenstein v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,32 to explain the relevance of publi-
cation with regards to the 1909 Copyright Act. In Roy Export, the court
stated that "publication" generally determines whether state [common]
or federal law is the source of any available copyright protection."33
Common law copyright protection attached from the time a work was
created and continued until the work was published or was registered as
a published or unpublished work. In other words, when a work was pub-
lished, common law copyright protection was extinguished. In order to
receive federal statutory protection after publication, the work must have
been registered in compliance with the 1909 Act. If not registered, the
published work entered the public domain.34
In its attempt to define "publication" for the purpose of the 1909
Act35 the Jones court relied on Rosette v. Rainbo Record Manufacturing
Corp. 36 There, the court held that the recording and selling of pho-
norecords did not constitute publication of the underlying musical com-
position. That conclusion was arrived at by extending the decision of
White-Smith.37 The Rosette court stated that: "if the infringing music
roll was not a copy of the composition ... the creation of a music roll by
the author himself would not make it a 'copy' of his work and hence not
a publication of it."3 8' Rosette interpreted White-Smith to stand for the
31. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 145 (1976).
32. 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
33. Id. at 1101.
34. Id.
35. The 1909 Copyright Act did not include a definition of "publication."
36. 354 F. Supp. 1183 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd per curiam, 546 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1976).
37. White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
38. Rosette, 354 F. Supp. at 1189.
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proposition that a mechanical reproduction constituted performance,
analogous to a live performance, and therefore was not a publication.39
Because the 1960 version of "Handy Man" was only available to the pub-
lic in the form of phonorecords, the court concluded that it was not
"published." Consequently, the 1960 version retained its common law
copyright protection as an unpublished work under the 1909 Copyright
Act.
As stated above, the defendants' third argument in favor of the mo-
tion for summary judgment was that Jones and Blackwell's 1984 registra-
tion of the 1960 version of "Handy Man" was ineffective. Defendants
asserted that the filing of a supplemental registration was the inappropri-
ate procedure to reflect changes in the content of a work already regis-
tered. However, the court found that no supplemental registration was
filed. Rather, in 1984, the 1960 version of "Handy Man" was registered
as a derivative work. 4 The court relied on the fact that plaintiffs did
nothing to suggest that the 1984 registration was supplemental rather
that derivative.41
Finally, the defendants asserted that the copyright owner of "Handy
Man"42 and the copyright owner of "Karma Chameleon"43 shared a cor-
porate identity; and therefore, Jones and Blackwell were estopped from
alleging infringement since CBS itself was a participant in the infringe-
ment. Because the defendants failed to present sufficient evidence of a
shared corporate identity, the court held that the plaintiffs were not es-
topped from alleging infringement."
APPROACHING A COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT ACTION
Before the enactment of the 1976 Act, intellectual property was pro-
tected by a dual system of copyright. Unpublished works were protected
39. Id.
40. A derivative work is defined as "a work based upon one or more pre-existing works,
such as a ... musical arrangement . . . [and a] work consisting of editorial revisions, annota-
tions, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of
authorship .... " 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). Prior to the effective date of the 1976 Act, deriva-
tive works were accorded copyright protection by § 7 of the 1909 Act, and unpublished works
were protected by the doctrine of common law copyright. 1 NIMMER supra note 28, § 3.01, 3-
2 n.2.
41. Jones v. Virgin Records, Ltd., 643 F. Supp. 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
42. At the time of the motion of summary judgment before the court, the copyright in
"Handy Man" was owned by CBS Catalogue Partnership, a subsidiary of CBS, Inc. Jones, 643
F. Supp. at 1155.
43. "Karma Chameleon" was released by Epic Records, a purported division of CBS, Inc.
Jones, 643 F. Supp. at 1160.
44. Jones, 643 F. Supp. at 1160.
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by a common law copyright and published works that were registered
were protected by statutory copyright. When Congress passed the 1976
Act, it intended to abolish the dual system of copyright and adopt a sin-
gle system of federal statutory copyright.45 Under the 1976 Act a work
obtains statutory copyright protection "from 'creation,' that is, from the
time a work is 'fixed' in a copy or phonorecord for the first time."'46 Any
work which was already protected by a statutory or common law copy-
right prior to January 1, 1978, the date the 1976 Act went into effect, is
given automatic statutory copyright protection under the 1976 Act.47
It appears as if the 1976 Act ended the era of common law copy-
right. For most purposes, the current Act does eliminate the distinction
between common law and statutory copyright. However, problems will
continue to arise for some time concerning the availability of pre-1978
common law protection. Specifically, common law protection will be sig-
nificant with regards to challenges to statutory copyrights, on the ground
that the work entered the public domain prior to January 1, 1978. Also,
there will be issues concerning pre-1978 infringement of common law
rights.4" Since a great deal of progress in rock and roll was before the
enactment of the 1976 Act, pre-1978 law will impact copyright law and
the music industry well into the future.
Because of the continuing significance of both the 1976 Act and pre-
1978 law, it is imperative that an attorney, when dealing with copyright
infringement, ascertain which Act is applicable to each issue separately
before analyzing that issue. Then, when papers are submitted to the
court, the conclusions as to the relevant Act should be stated to ensure a
correct analysis by the court.
Standing
When faced with a copyright infringement action, the initial inquiry
by an attorney and the court should be whether the plaintiff has standing
to sue for the alleged infringement. A person claiming that his work was
infringed must show that he has a sufficient interest in the work to main-
tain a copyright infringement suit. Under the 1909 Copyright Act, only
the copyright proprietor possessed a sufficient interest for standing to sue
45. Klekas v. EMI Films, Inc., 150 Cal. App. 3d 1102, 1109, 198 Cal. Rptr. 296 (1984)
(citing 1 NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B], at 1-8 (1983); H.R. REP. No. 1476,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 129-131 (1976)).
46. Id.
47. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1982).
48. Roy Export Co. Estab. of Vaduz v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 672 F.2d 1095,
1097 n.2 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982) (citing 1 NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 4.01[B] (1981)).
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for copyright infringement.4 9 A "copyright proprietor" was defined as
an author of the work or his assignee, who owned the copyright at the
time of the infringement.5"
However, the district court in Manning v. Miller Music Corp. 5 ex-
tended the rule to allow the composers of a song to bring suit although
they had assigned their copyright ownership. The Manning court held
that the peculiar relationship between an author and his or her publisher
created a fiduciary relationship.52 That relationship imposed "equitable
obligations upon the publisher beyond those ordinarily imposed by law
upon those dealing fully at arms' length, which [gave] the plaintiffs
standing to sue . . . ."" But the fiduciary relationship alone was not
enough for standing to maintain a copyright infringement suit. Under
the 1909 Act, an assignor who retained a beneficial interest under a pub-
lication contract could sue a third party for infringement only if the as-
signee of the work had first refused to bring such an action and was
joined as a party to the action.54
As previously stated, the 1976 Act also allows the beneficial owner
of a work to sue for copyright infringement.5 5 An author who retains a
right to receive royalties in an assignment contract is considered a benefi-
cial owner for standing purposes.5 6 The beneficial owner has an absolute
right to bring an infringement action under the current Act. It is no
longer required that the assignee refuse to bring the action and be joined
as a party.
Confusion has arisen over which Act the court should apply. To the
extent that a beneficial owner's standing to sue differs between the 1909
Act and the 1976 Act, the current Act should be applied to causes of
action arising after January 1, 1978, even if the instrument creating the
49. 17 U.S.C. § 101 [of the 1909 Act] provides that one who infringes the copyright in
any protected work shall be liable to 'pay to the copyright proprietor' damages. Sec-
tion 112 [of the 1909 Act] provides for injunctive relief to 'any party aggrieved' but
the 'party aggrieved' must have the right to maintain a suit under Section 101 as a
'copyright proprietor' in order to be entitled to such injunctive relief.
Manning v. Miller Music Corp., 174 F. Supp. 192, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (citing Goldwyn Pic-
tures Corp. v. Howells Sales Co., 282 F. 9 (2d Cir. 1922).
50. Manning, 174 F. Supp. at 194.
51. 174 F. Supp. 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
52. "The law implies a promise on the [publisher's] part to endeavor to make the [work]
productive, since that is the very purpose of the assignment of literary rights and the correla-
tive obligation to pay royalties." Manning, 174 F. Supp. at 196 (quoting Schisgall v. Fairchild
Publications, Inc., 137 N.Y.S.2d 312, 318 (1955)).
53. Manning, 174 F. Supp. at 196.
54. 3 NIMMER, supra note 28, § 12.02, at 12-28.
55. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1982).
56. Cortner v. Israel, 732 F.2d 267, 271 (2d Cir. 1984).
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beneficial interest was executed before 1978.17 Because all copyrighted
works in existence prior to 1978 were given automatic statutory protec-
tion under the 1976 Act, that statutory protection is invoked for causes
of action arising after the effective date of the new Act. The date the
allegedly infringed work was written or recorded is irrelevant for stand-
ing, as is the date of the instrument creating the beneficial interest in the
work. Common law causes of action are preserved only if they arose
"from undertakings commenced before January 1, 1978. " 58 "Undertak-
ings commenced" has been construed to mean when the cause of action
arose, in other words, when the infringement took place. 9
Therefore, when researching a standing issue for a copyright in-
fringement action, an attorney must first determine when the cause of
action arose. If the infringement took place before January 1, 1978, then
state law should be applied. If the cause of action arose after January 1,
1978 then the 1976 Act is the applicable law. The next inquiry should be
whether the plaintiff has a sufficient beneficial interest in the work to sue
for infringement according to the relevant law.
The cause of action in Jones arose in 1983 when "Karma Chame-
leon" was written and recorded. The fact that the assignment contract
giving Jones and Blackwell a beneficial interest in "Handy Man" was
executed in 1959 is not relevant to which Act applies to the standing
issue. The court in Jones correctly applied the 1976 Act when it deter-
mined that Jones and Blackwell had standing to sue for infringement. As
a result of applying the 1978 Act, Jones and Blackwell were accurately
found to have a sufficient beneficial interest in "Handy Man" to maintain
an infringement action.
Public Domain
Once it is determined that the plaintiff does have standing to sue for
infringement, the next issue is whether the allegedly infringed work is
protected by a copyright. If a work has entered the public domain, it is
no longer protected and a beneficial owner cannot sue for infringement.
Under the 1909 Act, the determination as to whether an unregis-
57. 3 NIMMER, supra note 28, § 12.02 at 12-28 n.20.1. According to Professor Nimmer,
"Cortner v. Israel (citation omitted) erroneously applied the 1909 Act because the instrument
was executed pre-1978. In affirming (citation omitted), the Court of Appeals avoided the issue
of which Act applies." Id.
58. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(2) (1982).
59. See Mention v. Gessell, 714 F.2d 87, 90 (9th Cir. 1983); Strout Realty, Inc. v. Country
22 Real Estate Corp., 493 F. Supp. 997, 1000 (W.D. Mo. 1980); Bromhall v. Rorvik, 478 F.
Supp. 361, 366 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Klekas v. EMI Films, Inc., 150 Cal. App. 3d 1102, 1109-10,
198 Cal. Rptr. 296 (1984).
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tered work was in the public domain or was protected by a common law
copyright depended on whether it was published or unpublished. As dis-
cussed above, if a published work was not registered, it entered the public
domain and lost all copyright protection.' Consequently, the definition
of "publication" often determined the outcome of a copyright infringe-
ment case. Because of the importance of the publication issue, the deci-
sion whether a literary or musical work was published by the sale of
phonorecords embodying such work was a highly disputed issue under
the 1909 Act.
The rule that public distribution of phonorecords does not consti-
tute publication of the underlying literary or musical work was first ex-
pressed in White-Smith,6 just prior to the adoption of the 1909 Act. In
1976, before the 1976 Act came into effect, the court in Rosette62 fol-
lowed the White-Smith decision. Nevertheless, most courts faced with
the question decided that public sale or other distribution of pho-
norecords does constitute publication.63
The rationale for declaring that distribution of phonorecords consti-
tutes "publication" is that, in permitting records of a work to be publicly
marketed, an author is engaging in a form of exploitation of his work,
and should therefore have been required to seek statutory copyright pro-
tection rather than common-law copyright protection.' 4 By declaring
that the distribution of phonorecords is publication, a court is forcing
compliance with the Copyright Act's registration requirements.
The dispute over the definition of publication was resolved by the
enactment of the 1976 Act. Under the current Act, "publication" is de-
fined as "the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lend-
ing."' 6' Furthermore, under section 102 of the 1976 Act, any "original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device,",66 are protected by a statutory copyright, whether or
not the work is published. The effect of section 102 is to prevent publica-
60. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34.
61. White-Smith Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908). See supra text accompa-
nying note 25.
62. Rosette v. Rainbo Record Mfg. Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1183 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), af'd per
curiam, 546 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1976). See supra text accompanying note 36.
63. 1 NIMMER, supra note 28, § 4.05[B], at 4-26. See also id. at n.18.
64. 1 NIMMER, supra note 28, § 4.05[B], at 4-26 (1987).
65. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
66. Id. at § 102.
1988]
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
tion from surrendering an unregistered work to the public domain.
Thus, by enacting that section, Congress was attempting to solve the
publication controversy.
Unfortunately, the 1976 Act did not completely resolve the publica-
tion dispute since pre-1978 law still is applicable in certain situations.
Therefore, because of the continuing relevance of the 1909 Act, it is nec-
essary for attorneys to determine which Act applies to the issue at hand.
No work which entered the public domain prior to January 1, 1978, may
be protected by a statutory copyright under the current Act.67 The de-
termination of whether the work was injected into the public domain
before the effective date of the 1976 Act depends on whether a copyright
existed as of January 1, 1978. If the work was not protected by either a
common law copyright or a statutory copyright under the 1909 Act as of
that date, it entered the public domain, and thus was not protected under
the 1976 Act.6" The determination whether a work was surrendered to
the public domain prior to January 1, 1978 "must be made according to
the copyright law as it existed before that date."
69
When analyzing whether a work entered the public domain prior to
1978, an attorney must first inquire into when the work was initially
distributed on phonorecords. If the work was first distributed after
January 1, 1978, then the 1976 Act would apply. If the first sales of
phonorecords occured prior to January 1, 1978, then the next question
would be whether the work was registered under the 1909 Act. If the
work was registered, then it was protected and did not enter the public
domain.
However, if the work was not registered under the 1909 Act but pre-
1978 phonorecord sales did occur then the issue becomes whether the
distribution of phonorecords constitutes publication. Because of the split
of authority, an attorney must research the law according to the jurisdic-
tion in which the action is brought. If distribution of phonorecords is
considered publication in the particular jurisdiction, then the work has
entered the public domain and an infringement action cannot be main-
tained. Conversely, if in the jurisdiction, courts hold that distribution is
not publication, then the work was protected by common law copyright
and automatically obtained statutory protection under the 1976 Act.
In Jones, the court correctly applied the 1909 Act to the publication
issue as the first sale of phonorecords of "Handy Man" occurred in 1960.
67. Brown v. Tabb, 714 F.2d 1088, 1090 (11th Cir. 1983).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1091 (citing Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 628 F.2d 1038,
1042 (7th Cir. 1980)).
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The court in Jones applied Rosette, 70 a case decided in the same circuit,7
to interpret the language of the 1909 Act. However, the majority of the
courts interpreting the 1909 Act do not hold as did the court in Rosette
and Jones. Most courts have come to the contrary conclusion that the
distribution of phonorecords is publication. 72 Had the Jones court found
that the recording and selling of "Handy Man" records did constitute
publication, the song would have entered the public domain prior to Jan-
uary 1, 1978 and summary judgment in favor of the defendants would
have been granted.
The rule in Rosette is useful to courts, such as Jones, which seek a
means to enforce, under the 1976 Act, the copyright in works which
were sold on phonorecords prior to January 1, 1978 and which were pro-
tected only by common law copyright. 7" At first blush, the Rosette deci-
sion may seem untenable because of the seemingly illogical conclusion
that distribution of records is not publication, especially since the cur-
rent Act explicitly defines publication to include the distribution of pho-
norecords. 74  However, upon analysis of past industry practice, 75 the
outcome appears justifiable.
Often copyright owners under the 1909 Act did not obtain a statu-
tory copyright before selling phonorecords, frequently as a deliberate
omission on advice of counsel who relied on White-Smith,76 to advise
clients that the sale of a phonorecord would not surrender the work to
the public domain. Consequently, the majority rule, that record sales
constitute publication, resulted in the discharge of a substantial body of
music into the public domain.77 In order to prevent harm to those who
followed industry practice, courts may wish to follow Jones and Rosette
70. Rosette v. Rainbo Record Mfg. Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1183 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd per
curiam, 546 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1976). See supra text accompanying note 36.
7 1. Because Rosette was affirmed per curiam by the Second Circuit, it is the most authori-
tative decision on the publication issue under the 1909 Act. 1 NIMMER, supra note 28,
§ 4.05[B] at 4-28 n.29.
72. 1 NIMMER, supra note 28, § 4.05[B] at 4-25-26. See McIntyre v. Double A Music
Corp., 166 F. Supp. 681 (S.D. Cal. 1958); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Miracle Record Co., 91
F. Supp. 473 (N.D. Ill. 1950); Mills Music, Inc. v. Cromwell Music, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 54
(S.D.N.Y. 1954); Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 53 Misc. 2d 462, 270 N.Y.S.2d 51 (Sup.
Ct. 1967); International Tape Mfrs. Ass'n v. Gerstein, 344 F. Supp. 38 (S.D. Fla. 1972), va-
cated for lack of ripeness 494 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1974).
73. 1 NIMMER, supra note 28, § 4.05[B] at 4-28-29.
74. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
75. 1 NIMMER, supra note 28, at § 4.05[B] [4].
76. White-Smith Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908). See supra text accompa-
nying note 25.
77. 1 NIMMER, supra note 28, § 4.05[B] at 4-31.
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and hold that distribution of phonorecords does not constitute
publication.
Notice
When faced with an action for the infringement of a literary or mu-
sical work, the notice requirement is irrelevant. Under both the 1909
Act and the 1976 Act, notice need not be affixed to phonorecords in or-
der to protect the underlying literary or musical work.7 8 Congress was
concerned that there would be confusion if the same notice requirements
applied to sound recordings and to the works they incorporate; therefore,
they chose to exempt literary or musical works embodied in pho-
norecords from the notice requirements of section 402 of the 1976 Act.7 9
However, the 1976 Act could have provided for a separate, distinguish-
able notice requirement for underlying literary or musical works. Such a
requirement would have solved the confusion problem, while at the same
time given the public notice that a work was copyrighted.
Registration
After deciding that a work has not entered the public domain and is
protected by a copyright, the next question is whether there has been an
infringement.8" The last issue inquires into what damages can be recov-
ered. Although this casenote does not discuss damages for copyright in-
fringement, the registration issue is intertwined with the damages issue
since the date of registration limits the amount of damages recoverable.
A work need not be registered in order to be protected by a copy-
right under the 1976 Act. Section 40881 governs copyright registration in
general and states that "[a]t any time during the subsistence of copyright
in any published or unpublished work, the owner of copyright or of any
exclusive right in the work may obtain registration of the copyright claim
.82 Yet, registration is a prerequisite to a copyright infringement
action.83 In addition, statutory damages are not recoverable for infringe-
ment prior to the registration of a work.84 For that reason, it is advisable
to register a song as soon as possible.
Since the court found that "Handy Man" was protected by common
78. See supra text accompanying notes 24-31.
79. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 145 (1976).
80. The criteria for what constitutes an infringement is beyond the scope of this article.
81. 17 U.S.C. § 408 (1982).
82. Id. at § 408(a).
83. Id. at § 411.
84. Id. at § 412.
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law copyright, it was automatically protected under the 1976 Act.
Therefore, Jones and Blackwell's 1984 registration of the song was neces-
sary for initiating a lawsuit, but not for copyright protection itself. If the
Jones court had decided the remedies issue,85 it is probable that the late
registration of "Handy Man" would have limited the amount of damages
recoverable to Jones and Blackwell.
CONCLUSION
Since both the 1909 and the 1976 Acts may be applicable, depending
on the issue, it is easy for the courts and parties to an action to become
confused. The court in Jones correctly used the appropriate Acts for
each issue but never explained the reason for using a given Act. In order
to provide better guidance for future courts, the Jones court should have
clearly indicated which Act it was applying and why. Unfortunately, the
confusion will continue since provisions of the 1909 Act will be applica-
ble for many years to come. Therefore, it is important for attorneys,
when dealing with copyright infringement, to first ascertain which Act is
applicable to each issue separately. The analysis and conclusions as to
the relevant Act should be stated in the papers filed with the court to
ensure a correct analysis by the court.
Copyright law was developed in order to protect those persons who
wish to turn their imaginations into a career. The imagination is one of
the most important aspects of the human intellect. Once a work is cre-
ated, it is necessary to protect that work as an incentive for future artists
to make use of their creativity. The Jones decision will help preserve
copyright protection for many of the early creators of rock and roll
music.
Susan B. Frank
85. Jones v. Virgin Records, Ltd., 643 F. Supp. 1153, 1161 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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